This rejoinder responds to some issues raised in the comments to my survey on collusion. The focus is on different assumptions on the punishment phase and on some aspects of competition policy. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005collusion, optimal punishment, competition policy,
Abstract This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming t...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case...
Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, Type I co...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/46450/1/10842_2005_Article_4870.pd
Abstract. This note comments on Feuerstein’s (Feuerstein, Switgard, BCollusion in industrial economi...
The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinit...
Industrial economics has successfully clarified the mechanism of collusive conduct and its facilitat...
Coordinated price fixing among firms in an industry remains one of the few practices which is per se...
Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the authors. All persons copying this information a...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint Collusion sustainability depends on firms ’ aptit...
Structural theories of collusion posit that demand and supply characteristics of an industry\u27s st...
In light of the increasing amount of interconnections and interdependencies between countries and fi...
Many instances of anticompetitive collusion are designed not to affect prices and output directly, b...
Abstract This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming t...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case...
Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, Type I co...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/46450/1/10842_2005_Article_4870.pd
Abstract. This note comments on Feuerstein’s (Feuerstein, Switgard, BCollusion in industrial economi...
The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinit...
Industrial economics has successfully clarified the mechanism of collusive conduct and its facilitat...
Coordinated price fixing among firms in an industry remains one of the few practices which is per se...
Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the authors. All persons copying this information a...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
We explore targeted punishment as an explanation for collusion among many firms. We run a series of ...
Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint Collusion sustainability depends on firms ’ aptit...
Structural theories of collusion posit that demand and supply characteristics of an industry\u27s st...
In light of the increasing amount of interconnections and interdependencies between countries and fi...
Many instances of anticompetitive collusion are designed not to affect prices and output directly, b...
Abstract This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming t...
Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case...
Collusion can profitably be classified into three distinct types. In our classification, Type I co...
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