Add to ORKGIn private-value ascending auctions, the winner's willingness to pay is not observed, leading to underidentification of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.
Within a novel model of correlated private values (CPV) we investigate how well a particular market ...
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetri...
We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders ’ private information ar...
This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on auction design. Unobs...
This paper examines identification in second-price and ascending auctions within the private-values ...
2006 We give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for fi...
Abstract. We present a new identification approach for ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries, w...
In rst-price auctions with interdependent bidder values, the distributions of private signals and va...
This paper studies discriminatory and uniform price auctions, the two most com-mon “multi-unit aucti...
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
We consider private value auctions where bidders ’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by as...
We consider private value auctions where bidders¿ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
There is a widespread belief that in auctions with private values, the seller's revenue is increasin...
While English auctions are the most common in practice, their rules typically lack sufficient struct...
We analyze all-pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals. We analyze the unique symmetr...
Within a novel model of correlated private values (CPV) we investigate how well a particular market ...
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetri...
We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders ’ private information ar...
This paper empirically studies the consequences of unobserved heterogeneity on auction design. Unobs...
This paper examines identification in second-price and ascending auctions within the private-values ...
2006 We give necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for fi...
Abstract. We present a new identification approach for ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries, w...
In rst-price auctions with interdependent bidder values, the distributions of private signals and va...
This paper studies discriminatory and uniform price auctions, the two most com-mon “multi-unit aucti...
We consider private value auctions where bidders’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
We consider private value auctions where bidders ’ types are dependent, a case usually treated by as...
We consider private value auctions where bidders¿ types are dependent, a case usually treated by ass...
There is a widespread belief that in auctions with private values, the seller's revenue is increasin...
While English auctions are the most common in practice, their rules typically lack sufficient struct...
We analyze all-pay auctions with affiliated values and binary signals. We analyze the unique symmetr...
Within a novel model of correlated private values (CPV) we investigate how well a particular market ...
We explore the impact of private information in sealed bid first price auctions. For a given symmetri...
We study a model of common-value auctions with two bidders in which bidders ’ private information ar...