Add to ORKGA simple protocol for coalition formation is presented. First, an order of the players is randomly chosen. Then, a coalition grows by sequentially incorporating new members in this order. The protocol is studied in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. If (weighted) utility transfers are feasible when everybody cooperates, then the expected subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation anticipated before any implemented game is the Shapley NTU value.
In the standard cooperative games, it is often implicitly assumed that any coalition may form and th...
Coalition formation is the process of bringing together two or more agents so as to achieve goals th...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
A simple protocol for coalition formation is presented. First, an order of the players is randomly c...
We introduce a solution function for Non-transferable Utility (NTU) games when prior coalition struc...
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agen...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU g...
In a cooperative transferable utility game each decision-making agent is usually represented by one ...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notio...
This dissertation has three main parts. The first part is devoted to transferable utility games with...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2017.htmlDocuments de travail du...
Cooperative game theory aims to predict the formation of coalitions, analyze the joint actions taken...
In the standard cooperative games, it is often implicitly assumed that any coalition may form and th...
Coalition formation is the process of bringing together two or more agents so as to achieve goals th...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
A simple protocol for coalition formation is presented. First, an order of the players is randomly c...
We introduce a solution function for Non-transferable Utility (NTU) games when prior coalition struc...
Coalitional games serve the purpose of modeling payoff distribution problems in scenarios where agen...
In this thesis we consider cooperative games with transferable utilities, which are also called TU g...
In a cooperative transferable utility game each decision-making agent is usually represented by one ...
This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in which every player's payoff depends o...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
We study the endogenous formation of coalitions for games without side payments by embodying a notio...
This dissertation has three main parts. The first part is devoted to transferable utility games with...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...
URL des Documents de travail : http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/cesdp/cesdp2017.htmlDocuments de travail du...
Cooperative game theory aims to predict the formation of coalitions, analyze the joint actions taken...
In the standard cooperative games, it is often implicitly assumed that any coalition may form and th...
Coalition formation is the process of bringing together two or more agents so as to achieve goals th...
We propose a modification of the Shapley value for monotonic games with a coalition structure. The r...