We investigate an economy in which firms have different risks to go bankrupt. We observe two things: first, workers in firms with higher bankruptcy risk (bad firms) always work less than workers in good firms. Second, the CEOs of bad firms may nonetheless receive larger wages. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005Tournaments, agency, incentives, compensation,
CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after b...
This doctoral dissertation examines the effect of an exogenous event on Executive compensation and t...
This thesis is a study of personal costs of bankruptcy for CEOs in Norway. If these costs are subst...
This paper studies the association between CEO compensation and firm performance in solvent but poor...
Conventional wisdom suggests that high agency costs explain the (excessive) amounts and (inefficient...
Conventional wisdom suggests that high agency costs explain the (excessive) amounts and (inefficient...
While managerial performance always plays a critical role in determining firm performance, a manager...
We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in cou...
June 2002, this version November 2002In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO emp...
June 2002, this version November 2002In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO emp...
This thesis examines the relationship between CEO turnover and bankrupt firm emergence using 836 ban...
In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO employment and places the firm in an ope...
CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after b...
Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates the employment of the chief executive officer (CE...
Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates the employment of the chief executive officer (CE...
CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after b...
This doctoral dissertation examines the effect of an exogenous event on Executive compensation and t...
This thesis is a study of personal costs of bankruptcy for CEOs in Norway. If these costs are subst...
This paper studies the association between CEO compensation and firm performance in solvent but poor...
Conventional wisdom suggests that high agency costs explain the (excessive) amounts and (inefficient...
Conventional wisdom suggests that high agency costs explain the (excessive) amounts and (inefficient...
While managerial performance always plays a critical role in determining firm performance, a manager...
We argue that the existence of CEO private control benefits complements managerial reputation in cou...
June 2002, this version November 2002In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO emp...
June 2002, this version November 2002In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO emp...
This thesis examines the relationship between CEO turnover and bankrupt firm emergence using 836 ban...
In Sweden, a bankruptcy filing automatically terminates CEO employment and places the firm in an ope...
CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after b...
Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates the employment of the chief executive officer (CE...
Swedish bankruptcy filing automatically terminates the employment of the chief executive officer (CE...
CEOs of large firms filing for bankruptcy are more likely to exit the executive labor market after b...
This doctoral dissertation examines the effect of an exogenous event on Executive compensation and t...
This thesis is a study of personal costs of bankruptcy for CEOs in Norway. If these costs are subst...
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