Add to ORKGWe investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.Mechanism Design, Efficiency, Risk Limit
We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We sho...
This paper studies a standard screening problem where the principal’s allocation rule is multi-dimen...
We present a functional framework for automated Bayesian and robust mechanism design based on a two-...
We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint dec...
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class o...
We consider two-player repeated games with nonobservable actions (cf. Lehrer 1989). An information m...
The paper shows that efficient cooperation processes exhibit gradualism when each player does not kn...
We survey some recent results in sequential decision making under uncertainty, where there is an inf...
A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which...
A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information-disclosure mechanism to ...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
The paper shows that efficient cooperation processes exhibit gradualism when each player does not kn...
While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the type space of the playe...
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational external...
We study information design in games with a continuum of actions such that the players' payoffs are ...
We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We sho...
This paper studies a standard screening problem where the principal’s allocation rule is multi-dimen...
We present a functional framework for automated Bayesian and robust mechanism design based on a two-...
We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint dec...
We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class o...
We consider two-player repeated games with nonobservable actions (cf. Lehrer 1989). An information m...
The paper shows that efficient cooperation processes exhibit gradualism when each player does not kn...
We survey some recent results in sequential decision making under uncertainty, where there is an inf...
A group of individuals with identical preferences must make a decision under uncertainty about which...
A designer is privately informed about the state and chooses an information-disclosure mechanism to ...
We study trading situations in which several principals on one side of the market compete to serve p...
The paper shows that efficient cooperation processes exhibit gradualism when each player does not kn...
While traditional mechanism design typically assumes isomorphism between the type space of the playe...
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational external...
We study information design in games with a continuum of actions such that the players' payoffs are ...
We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We sho...
This paper studies a standard screening problem where the principal’s allocation rule is multi-dimen...
We present a functional framework for automated Bayesian and robust mechanism design based on a two-...