Add to ORKGExtending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly pro?ts, the incumbent(s) may want to signal its weakness to invite entry of weaker firms
Bibliography: p. 17-18This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and endogenous ma...
The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that under an op...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent...
A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility an...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent firm, who has private information about his ow...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
Recent progress in the theory of entry-deterrence has cast strong doubts on the validity of the limi...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
In this paper we show that the claim that the price in a Stackelberg model is lower than the price i...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limi...
We expand Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents. Each inc...
An oligopolistic market with vertical product differentiation is parametrized in cost parameters. Th...
Bibliography: p. 17-18This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and endogenous ma...
The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that under an op...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent...
A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility an...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent firm, who has private information about his ow...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
Recent progress in the theory of entry-deterrence has cast strong doubts on the validity of the limi...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...
In this paper we show that the claim that the price in a Stackelberg model is lower than the price i...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limi...
We expand Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents. Each inc...
An oligopolistic market with vertical product differentiation is parametrized in cost parameters. Th...
Bibliography: p. 17-18This paper is about limit pricing under complete information and endogenous ma...
The paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that under an op...
This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite...