In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for profit-enhancing product advancements. The firms generate income by matching exogenously defined demand preferences with an appropriately composed product portfolio of their own. Demand preferences are initially unknown and first need to be revealed by an investigation of the possible product variations. The better firms approximate demand preferences, the higher their profits. In the ensuing innovation race, firms interact through information spillovers resulting from the imperfect appropriability of research successes. In the random period of the experiment, the continuity of the search process is disturbed by an exogenous shock that affect...
An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strateg...
Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is ad...
This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditu...
In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for ...
In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for ...
Based on an extended game-theoretic innovation-race model, we derive some Schumpeterian hypotheses o...
The paper analyzes the effects of competitive intensity on firms' incentives to invest in process in...
The theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the (potential) entrant ...
Few topics in industrial organization have received as much attention- theoretical, empirical or pol...
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. ...
The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms' investments in process innovati...
We study entry in a growing market by ex-ante symmetric duopolists when sunk costs differ for the in...
One of the most discussed topics regarding innovation is the question, whether the current market le...
We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regar...
This paper derives a three stage Cournot–oligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on intro...
An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strateg...
Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is ad...
This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditu...
In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for ...
In an experimental setting, firms in a duopoly market engage in a patent tournament and compete for ...
Based on an extended game-theoretic innovation-race model, we derive some Schumpeterian hypotheses o...
The paper analyzes the effects of competitive intensity on firms' incentives to invest in process in...
The theoretical discussion concerning the question whether the incumbent or the (potential) entrant ...
Few topics in industrial organization have received as much attention- theoretical, empirical or pol...
This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. ...
The paper analyzes the effects of more intense competition on firms' investments in process innovati...
We study entry in a growing market by ex-ante symmetric duopolists when sunk costs differ for the in...
One of the most discussed topics regarding innovation is the question, whether the current market le...
We study a two-stage, winner-takes-all, R&D race, in which, at the outset, firms are uncertain regar...
This paper derives a three stage Cournot–oligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on intro...
An innovative firm with private information about its indivisible process innovation chooses strateg...
Is more intense product market competition and imitation good or bad for growth? This question is ad...
This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditu...