DOIAbstract
Ordering exchange contracts, Ordinal efficiency, Random assignment problem, Random serial dictatorship,
Ordering exchange contracts, Ordinal efficiency, Random assignment problem, Random serial dictatorship,
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when mon...
Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assignin...
We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one ...
Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dic...
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to ind...
All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be p...
Abstract. In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bo-gomolnaia and Mou...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We es...
In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only socia...
We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment p...
In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only socia...
We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted ca...
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via sub...
Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assignin...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when mon...
Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assignin...
We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one ...
Two fundamental problems in economics are voting and assignment. In both settings, random serial dic...
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to ind...
All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be p...
Abstract. In the random assignment problem, the probabilistic serial mechanism (Bo-gomolnaia and Mou...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We es...
In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only socia...
We provide a new, welfarist, interpretation of the well-known Serial rule in the random assignment p...
In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only socia...
We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted ca...
Due to copyright restrictions, the access to the full text of this article is only available via sub...
Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assignin...
This paper considers the problem of allocating N indivisible objects among N agents according to the...
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when mon...
Abstract. The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assignin...
We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent receives one ...
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