Add to ORKGIf a connected component of perfect equilibria of a two-player game contains a stable set as defined by Mertens, then the component is itself stable. Thus the stable sets maximal under inclusion are connected components of perfect equilibria.Perfect equilibria; stable sets.
We exhibit the structure of totally balanced games, discuss some conditions for a game to be extreme...
Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator represe...
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. Th...
In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in th...
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subse...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A refinement of ...
We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. T...
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subse...
In this paper, an alternative definition of stable sets, defined by Mertens [Mertens, 1989. Stable e...
AbstractWe have extended a two player game-theoretical model proposed by V. Gurvich [To theory of mu...
International audienceThis paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form g...
AbstractIn this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for a bimatrix...
We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games with perfect recall...
We exhibit the structure of totally balanced games, discuss some conditions for a game to be extreme...
Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator represe...
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. Th...
In this paper a procedure is described that computes for a given bimatrix game all stable sets in th...
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subse...
[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] A refinement of ...
We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. T...
A refinement of the set of Nash equilibria that satisfies two assumptions is shown to select a subse...
In this paper, an alternative definition of stable sets, defined by Mertens [Mertens, 1989. Stable e...
AbstractWe have extended a two player game-theoretical model proposed by V. Gurvich [To theory of mu...
International audienceThis paper revisits the analysis of stable sets in two-player strategic-form g...
AbstractIn this paper, it is shown that the structure of the set of Pareto equilibria for a bimatrix...
We impose three conditions on refinements of the Nash equilibria of finite games with perfect recall...
We exhibit the structure of totally balanced games, discuss some conditions for a game to be extreme...
Jordan [2006] defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator represe...
We study the problem of computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE) in 2-player games. Th...