Making Power-sharing Work : Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation

For managing and settling ethnic conflicts, power-sharing arrangements often seem an appropriate solution. The former antagonists are forced to work together and make decision by consensus; the ultimate goal is to turn opponents into partners. Obviously, this concept can only be successful under specific conditions and by specific arrangements. Based on a comparative analysis of six cases of power sharing, the paper aims (a) to identify favourable conditions as well as (b) to evaluate the quality of regulations. For successful conflict regulation, both aspects have to be taken into account: if the most favourable conditions are missing or will not be attained over time, then the "best" power-sharing constitution will fail. If, in turn, "bad" or insufficient rules and procedures prevail, then even the presence of comparatively beneficial factors will probably not avoid failure. Success will be understood as achievement and sustainability of a particular solution. The paper is subdivided into four sections: First, the concept of power-sharing (or consociationalism) will be mapped out. Second, successful and failed European cases of power-sharing will be briefly presented. Third, by comparing these cases the explanatory power of some potentially favourable conditions will be examined, and fourth, based on empirical experiences "better" regulations have to be distinguished from more problematic or even counter-productive ones