Add to ORKGThis short paper proves the following conjecture of D. Bouyssou: a preference aggregation function built by iteration of a strictly monotonic and symmetric social choice correspondence cannot be strictly monotonic.
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majo...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
We consider a decision maker that holds multiple preferences simultaneously, each with different st...
We consider a decision maker that holds multiple preferences simultaneously, each with different st...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majo...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
We consider a decision maker that holds multiple preferences simultaneously, each with different st...
We consider a decision maker that holds multiple preferences simultaneously, each with different st...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Impossibility theorems for preference correspondences based on a new monotonicity concept are discus...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
Collective decisions are modeled by preference correspondences (rules). In particular, we focus on a...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that App...
We come close to characterizing the class of social choice correspondences that are implementable in...
ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majo...