We consider a new method of public goods provision: monetization. The government makes a particular public good the specie of money and commits itself to buy the public good at a predetermined nominal price and adjust money supply so that the ratio between the public good reserve and money supply equals a predetermined reserve ratio. In a two-country model, in which one country issues international currency and the other issues domestic currency, we show that if the government that issues the international currency adopts a monetization policy, it can attain both the optimal level of public goods provision and equal cost sharing for the public goods provision between the two countries by choosing the nominal price of the public good and the...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good c...
We investigate a mixed oligopoly in a free-entry market in the presence of shadow cost of public fun...
We consider a new method of public goods provision: monetization. The government makes a particular ...
This paper theoretically examines an imaginary monetary regime in which the private provision of glo...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods...
One challenge in addressing transboundary problems such as climate change is the incentive to free-r...
This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive contributions to public goods in ...
Three dimensions of public goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being excluded from ben...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish positive contributions to public goods...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
When a poublic good ist excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study...
This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the...
This paper considers the extension of the theory of public consumption goods to an international co...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good c...
We investigate a mixed oligopoly in a free-entry market in the presence of shadow cost of public fun...
We consider a new method of public goods provision: monetization. The government makes a particular ...
This paper theoretically examines an imaginary monetary regime in which the private provision of glo...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establishnpositive contributions to public goods...
One challenge in addressing transboundary problems such as climate change is the incentive to free-r...
This paper proposes a simple mechanism aimed to establish positive contributions to public goods in ...
Three dimensions of public goods--nonrivalry of benefits, the possibility of being excluded from ben...
This paper proposes a simple two-stage mechanism to establish positive contributions to public goods...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
When a poublic good ist excludable it is possible to charge individuals for using the good. We study...
This paper presents an experimental examination of the Falkinger (1996) mechanism for overcoming the...
This paper considers the extension of the theory of public consumption goods to an international co...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear e...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually becomepublic-good c...
We investigate a mixed oligopoly in a free-entry market in the presence of shadow cost of public fun...