What Is Inference? Or the Force of Reasoning

Abstract What are we doing when we make inferences? I argue that to make an inference is to attach inferential force to an argument. Inferential force must be understood in analogy to assertoric force, and an argument is a structure of contents. I call this the “Force Account of inference.” I develop this account by first establishing two criteria of adequacy for accounts of inference. First, such accounts must explain why it is absurd to make an inference one believes to be bad. The upshot is that if someone makes an inference, she must take her inference to be good. Second, accounts of inference must explain why we cannot take our inferences to be good---in the sense that matters for inference---by merely accepting testimony to the effect that they are good. Next, I spell out the Force Account in detail, and I show that it meets these two criteria of adequacy. According to the Force Account, we make an inference by reflectively endorsing the inference as good. That allows us to understand in what sense inference is a self-conscious and active manifestation of reason. I then demonstrate that the account can be fruitfully applied to debates in epistemology and practical philosophy. In particular, I show that the Force Account gives us the resources to settle debates about inferential internalism and pure moral testimony