Organizational forms often serve as vehicles for the appropriation of quasi-rent. Capitalist firms typically emerge when production requires noncontractible investments in specific physical assets because worker control would divert quasi-rents away from ass et owners ex post. Conversely, labor-managed firms tend to emerge in niches requiring specialized human capital but general-purpose physi cal assets. A key result is that capitalist firms can persist in competitive markets even when labor-managed firms would yield a larg er total surplus. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.
Does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm? The formation of a firm ...
The relationship between labor and capital is one of mutual antagonism and interdependence. Conflict...
This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the...
Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse ...
The division of firm surplus between labor and shareholders, and its impact on firms’ value creation...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic...
It is shown that in an economy with non-marginal set-up costs on the capital side, which imply a min...
What role does labor play in firms ’ market value? We explore this question using a production-based...
What role does labour play in firms’ market value? We explore this question using a production-based...
In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of busi...
What role does labor play in a firm’s market value? We explore this question using a production-base...
An extensive literature has examined whether corporatist national wage bargaining systems can delive...
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic barg...
Firms let their employees operate assets to produce goods and services. Firm-specificity of asset an...
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic barg...
Does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm? The formation of a firm ...
The relationship between labor and capital is one of mutual antagonism and interdependence. Conflict...
This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the...
Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse ...
The division of firm surplus between labor and shareholders, and its impact on firms’ value creation...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic...
It is shown that in an economy with non-marginal set-up costs on the capital side, which imply a min...
What role does labor play in firms ’ market value? We explore this question using a production-based...
What role does labour play in firms’ market value? We explore this question using a production-based...
In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of busi...
What role does labor play in a firm’s market value? We explore this question using a production-base...
An extensive literature has examined whether corporatist national wage bargaining systems can delive...
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic barg...
Firms let their employees operate assets to produce goods and services. Firm-specificity of asset an...
This article provides a model of labor market equilibrium with search and within-firm strategic barg...
Does the ownership of capital confer a strategic advantage within the firm? The formation of a firm ...
The relationship between labor and capital is one of mutual antagonism and interdependence. Conflict...
This paper develops a simple model as to why unionized Cournot firms acting non-cooperatively in the...