Nuclear materials control and accountability criteria for upgrades measures

As a result of major political and societal changes in the past several years, methods of nuclear material control may no longer be as effective as in the past in Russia, the Newly Independent States (NIS), and the Baltic States (BS). The objective of the Department of Energy (DOE) Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program (MPC and A) is to reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation by collaborating with Russia, NIS, and BS governments to promote western-style MPC and A. This cooperation will improve the MPC and A on all weapons useable nuclear materials and will establish a sustainable infrastructure to provide future support and maintenance for these technology-based improvements. Nuclear materials of proliferation concern include materials of the types and quantities that can be most easily and directly used in a nuclear weapon. Sabotage of nuclear material is an event of great concern and potentially disastrous consequences to both the US and the host country. However, sabotage is currently beyond the scope of program direction and cannot be used to justify US-funded MPC and A upgrades. Judicious MPC and A upgrades designed to protect against insider and outsider theft scenarios would also provide addition, although not comprehensive, protection against saboteurs. This paper provides some suggestions to establish consistency in prioritizing system-enhancement efforts at nuclear material facilities. The suggestions in this paper are consistent with DOE policy and directions and should be used as a supplement to any policy directives issued by NN-40, DOE Russia/NIS Task Force