Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that while demand-deposit contracts let banks provide liquidity, they expose them to panic-based bank runs. However, their model does not provide tools to derive the probability of the bank-run equilibrium, and thus cannot determine whether banks increase welfare overall. We study a modified model in which the fundamentals determine which equilibrium occurs. This lets us compute the ex ante probability of panic-based bank runs and relate it to the contract. We find conditions under which banks increase welfare overall and construct a demand-deposit contract that trades off the benefits from liquidity against the costs of runs. Copyright 2005 by The American Finance Association.
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...
We study a model of bank runs based on Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. We assume that agents do not have ...
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange m...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broa...
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broa...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
We study how banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model with limited ...
This article uses narrative and numerical examples to exposit the ideas in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)...
This paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" runs in the banking system, in an environment...
We demonstrate that a bank can offer demand deposits and yet avoid bank runs without deposit insuran...
In this paper the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Politic. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model is extended by small co...
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...
We study a model of bank runs based on Diamond and Dybvig [1983]. We assume that agents do not have ...
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange m...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
This paper extends Diamond and Dybvig’s model [J. Political Economy 91 (1983) 401] to a framework in...
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broa...
We analyze a banking system in which the class of feasible deposit contracts, or mechanisms, is broa...
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provide an analytical framework of modern banking: The key role of banks i...
We study how banking panics unfold in a version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model with limited ...
This article uses narrative and numerical examples to exposit the ideas in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)...
This paper models information-induced and "pure-panic" runs in the banking system, in an environment...
We demonstrate that a bank can offer demand deposits and yet avoid bank runs without deposit insuran...
In this paper the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Politic. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model is extended by small co...
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that som...
This paper presents a model consistent with the business cycle view of the origins of banking panics...