Atmospheric dispersion modeling for the worst-case detonation accident at the proposed Advanced Hydrotest Facility

The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) was requested to estimate credible worst-case dose, air concentration, and deposition of airborne hazardous materials that would result from a worst-case detonation accident at the proposed Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHT) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Consequences were estimated at the closest onsite facility, the Device Assembly Facility (DOFF), and offsite location (intersection of Highway and U.S. 95). The materials considered in this analysis were weapon-grade plutonium, beryllium, and hydrogen fluoride which is a combustion product whose concentration is dependent upon the quantity of high explosives. The analysis compares the calculated results with action guidelines published by the Department of Defense in DoD 5100.52-M (Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures). Results indicate that based on a one kg release of plutonium the whole body radiation dose could be as high as 3 Rem at the DOFF. This level approaches the 5 Rem level for which the Department of Defense requires respiratory protection, recommends sheltering and the consideration of evacuation. Deposition levels at the DOFF could approach 6 uCi/m{sup 2} for which the Department of Defense recommends access on a need-only basis and suggests that a possible controlled evacuation might be required. For a one kg release of plutonium, the dose at the nearest off-site location could reach 0.5. At this level, the Department of Defense suggests that sheltering be considered. For a one kg release of beryllium, the peak 5-minute concentration at the DOFF could be as as 20% of 6xlO{sup -3} mg/m{sup 2} which is the applicable by Response Planning Guideline (ERPG-1). At the nearest offsite location, the beryllium concentrations from a one kg release would be two orders of magnitude less than the same guideline. For the detonation of 100 kg of the explosive LX-17, the concentration of hydrogen fluoride at both the DOFF and the nearest offsite location would be four orders of magnitude less than the lowest applicable Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG-1). The calculations and analysis reported here indicate that emergency response planning for such an accident at the present proposed location of the ABF should include provisions for the protection of personnel located at the DOFF and their possible evacuation