Three complementary measurement technologies have been identified as candidates for use in the verification of excess plutonium of weapons origin. These technologies: high-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, neutron multiplicity counting, and low-resolution gamma-ray spectroscopy, are mature, robust technologies. The high-resolution gamma-ray system, Pu-600, uses the 630--670 keV region of the emitted gamma-ray spectrum to determine the ratio of {sup 240}Pu to {sup 239}Pu. It is useful in verifying the presence of plutonium and the presence of weapons-grade plutonium. Neutron multiplicity counting is well suited for verifying that the plutonium is of a safeguardable quantity and is weapons-quality material, as opposed to residue or waste. In...
Non-intrusive verification procedures by measuring nuclear radiation in situ are discussed. Radiatio...
From joint meeting of the American Nuclear Society and the Atomic Industrial Forum and Nuclear Eneng...
Confidence in future nuclear arms control agreements could be enhanced by direct verification of war...
Gamma rays are ideal probes for the determination of information about the special nuclear material ...
High burnup-plutonium holdup has been assayed quantitatively by low resolution gamma-ray spectrometr...
The ability to detect the presence of Pu and identify the material as weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu)...
The nondestructive assay of plutonium is important as a safeguard tool in accounting for stategic nu...
To calibrate neutron coincidence and neutron multiplicity counters for passive assay of plutonium, c...
For meaningful and effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, a combination of warhead...
This work integrates analysis techniques common to destructive nuclear forensics and non-destructive...
The large neutron multiplicity counter (LNMC), also known as the 30-gal.-drum neutron multiplicity c...
Plutonium is one of the principal materials of both commercial and military nuclear power. It is pro...
A unique detector design incorporating a {sup 6}Li-based capture medium, ZnS scintillator, and wavel...
Future nuclear disarmament agreements between nations may require technical measures to ascertain ea...
This paper describes a series of neutron multiplicity measurements of large plutonium samples at the...
Non-intrusive verification procedures by measuring nuclear radiation in situ are discussed. Radiatio...
From joint meeting of the American Nuclear Society and the Atomic Industrial Forum and Nuclear Eneng...
Confidence in future nuclear arms control agreements could be enhanced by direct verification of war...
Gamma rays are ideal probes for the determination of information about the special nuclear material ...
High burnup-plutonium holdup has been assayed quantitatively by low resolution gamma-ray spectrometr...
The ability to detect the presence of Pu and identify the material as weapons-grade plutonium (WGPu)...
The nondestructive assay of plutonium is important as a safeguard tool in accounting for stategic nu...
To calibrate neutron coincidence and neutron multiplicity counters for passive assay of plutonium, c...
For meaningful and effective verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement, a combination of warhead...
This work integrates analysis techniques common to destructive nuclear forensics and non-destructive...
The large neutron multiplicity counter (LNMC), also known as the 30-gal.-drum neutron multiplicity c...
Plutonium is one of the principal materials of both commercial and military nuclear power. It is pro...
A unique detector design incorporating a {sup 6}Li-based capture medium, ZnS scintillator, and wavel...
Future nuclear disarmament agreements between nations may require technical measures to ascertain ea...
This paper describes a series of neutron multiplicity measurements of large plutonium samples at the...
Non-intrusive verification procedures by measuring nuclear radiation in situ are discussed. Radiatio...
From joint meeting of the American Nuclear Society and the Atomic Industrial Forum and Nuclear Eneng...
Confidence in future nuclear arms control agreements could be enhanced by direct verification of war...