Options for monitoring the US Russian bilateral cutoff agreement on shutdown of plutonium production reactors

Six options are presented for monitoring operating Russian reactors and reprocessing plants under the bilateral cutoff agreement. In order of increasing intrusiveness they are: (A) monitoring of product (oxide or metal) storage only, supplemented with transparency measures at the reactors, (B) monitoring of product storage and reactor operating parameters, to assess reactor plutonium production, (C) monitoring of product storage, reactor operating parameters, and the input accountability tank of the reprocessing plant, (D) monitoring of product storage, the input accountability tank of the reprocessing plant, and application of surveillance to spent fuel, (E) IAEA/NPT-based material accountancy verification without major facility upgrades, and (F) IAEA/NPT-based safeguards, attempting to fulfill IAEA standards for material accountancy accuracy. Each of these options is considered in terms of cost, inspection effort, and effectiveness; however, the paper emphasizes the many uncertainties attendant on such assessments based on our current state of knowledge of these facilities