Implementation of neutron counting techniques at US facilities for IAEA verification of excess materials from nuclear weapons production

The U.S. Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, announced by President Clinton before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, commits the U.S. to placing under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards excess nuclear materials no longer needed for the U.S. nuclear deterrent. As of July 1, 1995, the IAEA had completed Initial Physical Inventory Verification (IPIV) at two facilities: a storage vault in the Oak Ridge Y-12 plant containing highly enriched uranium (HOW) metal and another storage vault in the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) containing plutonium oxide and plutonium-bearing residues. Another plutonium- storage vault, located at Rocky Flats, is scheduled for the IPIV in the fall of 1995. Conventional neutron coincidence counting is one of the routinely applied IAEA nondestructive assay (ND) methods for verification of uranium and plutonium. However, at all three facilities mentioned above, neutron ND equipment had to be modified or developed for specific facility needs such as the type and configuration of material placed under safeguards. This document describes those modifications and developments