Design and Analysis of Novel Verifiable Voting Schemes

Free and fair elections are the basis for democracy, but conducting elections is not an easy task. Different groups of people are trying to influence the outcome of the election in their favor using the range of methods, from campaigning for a particular candidate to well-financed lobbying. Often the stakes are too high, and the methods are illegal. Two main properties of any voting scheme are the privacy of a voter’s choice and the integrity of the tally. Unfortunately, they are mutually exclusive. Integrity requires making elections transparent and auditable, but at the same time, we must preserve a voter’s privacy. It is always a trade-off between these two requirements. Current voting schemes favor privacy over auditability, and thus, they are vulnerable to voting fraud. I propose two novel voting systems that can achieve both privacy and verifiability. The first protocol is based on cryptographical primitives to ensure the integrity of the final tally and privacy of the voter. The second protocol is a simple paper-based voting scheme that achieves almost the same level of security without usage of cryptography