Defense Logistics: GAO's Observations on Maintenance Aspects of the Navy's Fleet Response Plan

Correspondence issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom have prompted major changes in the employment of naval forces around the globe. These two events resulted in an ultimate surging to deploy seven carrier strike groups and the largest amphibious task force assembled in decades. According to the Navy, at the time of the September 11 attacks and in preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom, only a small number of ships at peak readiness were forward deployed. However, most of the Navy's ships were not available for use because they were in early stages of their training cycles. This prompted the Navy, in March 2003, to develop a concept to enhance its deployment readiness strategy. The Navy's Fleet Response Plan, implemented in May 2003, evolved from a concept to institutionalize an enhanced surge capability. Because of potential budget implications, Congress asked us to review the assumption that the Navy's implementation of its Fleet Response Plan would reduce the duration of aircraft carrier depot maintenance intervals between deployment periods from approximately 18 months to 9 months. Specifically, our objectives were to identify the likely impacts and risks for the Navy's logistics requirements that could result from shortened maintenance cycles between deployments; the Navy's plan for fulfilling major repair and maintenance requirements; upgrading and modernizing weapons, communications, and engineering systems; and performing nuclear refueling in the shortened maintenance cycle; and how the Navy's budget supports its plan to shorten maintenance cycles.