This paper reports a surprising finding from an experiment on giving to welfare recipients. The experiment tests how offers of money in n-donor dictator games are affected by 1) donors' humanitarian and egalitarian values and 2) direct information about the recipients' work-preferences. People who are self-reported humanitarians and egalitarians have giving that is highly elastic with respect to the apparent worthiness of the recipient. Among high scoring humanitarian-egalitarians, the median offer to a recipient who appeared industrious was $5.00, while the median offer to a recipient who appeared lazy was only $1.00. Among low scoring humanitarian-egalitarians, the median offer was $1.00 in both conditions. I refer to this combination of ...
We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequa...
Unfairness commonly impacts human economic decision-making. However, whether inequity aversion impai...
Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We show that...
This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I c...
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented her...
What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the Salvation ...
Abstract What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the S...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators' empathy toward the Recipients to ...
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological...
Because perceptions of luck, hard work, and the idea of a “me vs. you” mindset often influence peopl...
We experimentally investigate the effect of endowment allocation procedures on social preferences us...
A large part of the total charitable giving (approximately 70%) in the United States come from indiv...
It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little ...
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game we expected Dictators’ empathy towards the Recipients to ...
We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequa...
Unfairness commonly impacts human economic decision-making. However, whether inequity aversion impai...
Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We show that...
This paper examines possible motives and institutional factors that impact giving. Specifically, I c...
Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented her...
What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the Salvation ...
Abstract What triggers giving? We explore this in a randomized natural field experiment during the S...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game, we expected Dictators' empathy toward the Recipients to ...
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological...
Because perceptions of luck, hard work, and the idea of a “me vs. you” mindset often influence peopl...
We experimentally investigate the effect of endowment allocation procedures on social preferences us...
A large part of the total charitable giving (approximately 70%) in the United States come from indiv...
It is often difficult for donors to predict the value of charitable giving because they know little ...
Mechanisms supporting human ultra-cooperativeness are very much subject to debate. One psychological...
In a monetarily incentivized Dictator Game we expected Dictators’ empathy towards the Recipients to ...
We investigate the consequences of a pure income effect on the altruistic behavior of donors. Inequa...
Unfairness commonly impacts human economic decision-making. However, whether inequity aversion impai...
Why do people give when asked, but prefer not to be asked, and even take when possible? We show that...