Terms an Content

I assume the externalist claims that meanings are not in the head, extension is not determined by intension, and the environment contributes to the meaning of terms. I also accept that usually the content of our thoughts is partially fixed by the environment through its contribution to the meaning of terms that take part jn those thoughts. However, in spite of granting all this, I intend to argue that the meaning of the terms we use in thinking or in expressing a thought does not always determine (not even partially) the content of the thought we have. I think that we can distinguish between a deferential and a referential use of terms such as common names and adjectives, and that it is only when we use a term in a deferential way that the "real" meaning of the term contributes to the content of our thought. I judge that by means of this distinction we can throw some light on the current debate upon whether externalism is compatible with the direct knowledge of the content of our thoughts. I sha11 briefly treat this question in the last part of this paper