Add to ORKGWe present a simple two(-country) by two(-good) differental game model of international trade in which the governments of the two countries play a tariff-setting game. We explicitly derive a unilateral optimum tarifff rate and then a Markov-perfect equilibrium pair of tariff strategies (bilateral optimum tariff strategies) and compare the welfare level of each country among autarchic, free-trade, unilateral and bilateral optimum-tariff equilibria.Tariff-setting game, Durbale consumption good, Markov-perfect strategies, The rate of time preference
AbstractA three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the impact of a coalition within ...
We analyze a infinitely repeated tariff-setting game by two large countries with alternating moves. ...
We examine a four player stochastic game in which two of the players are representative households ...
The paper analyzes tariff-settings by two large countries, in an alternating move, in-finitely repea...
We study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and di...
Recent work in game theory has demonstrated how cooperative outcomes can be sustained when the game ...
This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of ...
We analyze an infinitely repeated tariff-setting game played by two large countries with alternating...
A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of ta...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the impact on the welfare of resource-importing countries when they ...
In this paper, we develop a two-country world di¤erential game model with a polluting firm in each c...
In implementing trade policy measures, governments usually select from a range of instruments includ...
This paper establishes relationships between static Nash equilibria and dynamic Markov perfect equil...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.A three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the...
Bibliography: p. 33-34This paper is consideration of strategic aspects of national saving policies i...
AbstractA three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the impact of a coalition within ...
We analyze a infinitely repeated tariff-setting game by two large countries with alternating moves. ...
We examine a four player stochastic game in which two of the players are representative households ...
The paper analyzes tariff-settings by two large countries, in an alternating move, in-finitely repea...
We study a simple model of tariff wars and trade deals in which government revenue collection and di...
Recent work in game theory has demonstrated how cooperative outcomes can be sustained when the game ...
This paper characterizes, under the most general conditions to date, the steady-state equilibria of ...
We analyze an infinitely repeated tariff-setting game played by two large countries with alternating...
A simple two-country model of economic geography is constructed in order to examine the effect of ta...
[[abstract]]This paper examines the impact on the welfare of resource-importing countries when they ...
In this paper, we develop a two-country world di¤erential game model with a polluting firm in each c...
In implementing trade policy measures, governments usually select from a range of instruments includ...
This paper establishes relationships between static Nash equilibria and dynamic Markov perfect equil...
Cataloged from PDF version of article.A three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the...
Bibliography: p. 33-34This paper is consideration of strategic aspects of national saving policies i...
AbstractA three-country, two-bloc trade model is used to determine the impact of a coalition within ...
We analyze a infinitely repeated tariff-setting game by two large countries with alternating moves. ...
We examine a four player stochastic game in which two of the players are representative households ...