Suppose a bidder must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating his own private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder would like to know the private values of other bidders. It also can explain sniping — flurries of bids at the end of auctions with deadlines — as the result of other bidders trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder to examine his value.
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey ...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...
A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly esti...
A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly esti...
Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions...
Bidders in auctions must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating the most they are w...
Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions...
Landsberger, et al. (2001) have identified optimal bidder behavior in first-price private-value auct...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey ...
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingnes...
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingnes...
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey ...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...
A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly esti...
A rational bidder in a private-value auction should be reluctant to incur the cost of perfectly esti...
Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions...
Bidders in auctions must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating the most they are w...
Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions...
Landsberger, et al. (2001) have identified optimal bidder behavior in first-price private-value auct...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about h...
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey ...
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingnes...
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information about their willingnes...
Bidding one’s value in a second-price, private-value auction is a weakly dominant solution (Vickrey ...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...
We consider parametric examples of two-bidder private value auctions in which each bidder observes h...