Mainstream game theory explains cooperation as the outcome of the interaction of agents who permanently pursue their individual goals. Amartya Sen argues instead that cooperation can only be understood by positing a type of rule-following behaviour that can be (and often is) out of phase with the pursuit of individual goals, due to the existence of a collective identity. However, Sen does not clarify the ontological preconditions for the type of social behaviour he describes. I will argue that Sen's account of collective identity can be best interpreted in the light of John Searle's notion of collective intentionality, while Sen's explanation of rule-following behavior and agency is best understood using the critical realist transformationa...
This article aims to present some of the initial work of developing a social science grounded game t...
In this paper I discuss Searle's analysis of social ontology in the light of his account of the sour...
We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of ...
Collective intentionality is of central importance in social ontology. In this paper, we will discus...
People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and ac...
Game Theory, Experimental Games and many other social theorists use games as an analytic device to u...
Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rule...
My aim is to underline a few limits of an intentionalist approach to cognitive interaction and socia...
Cooperation is the fundamental feature of intelligent beings. It makes them able to evolve complex s...
Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoreti...
There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. Howeve...
What kind of things are social rules? The paper starts from the critique of social rules articulated...
Game Theory can simultaneously be viewed as a positive and a normative theory: on one hand, it descr...
Tuomela’s work on group agents and social institutionsis very rich and insightful. Although I agree ...
This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective...
This article aims to present some of the initial work of developing a social science grounded game t...
In this paper I discuss Searle's analysis of social ontology in the light of his account of the sour...
We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of ...
Collective intentionality is of central importance in social ontology. In this paper, we will discus...
People inhabit a vast and intricate social network nowadays. In addition to our own decisions and ac...
Game Theory, Experimental Games and many other social theorists use games as an analytic device to u...
Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rule...
My aim is to underline a few limits of an intentionalist approach to cognitive interaction and socia...
Cooperation is the fundamental feature of intelligent beings. It makes them able to evolve complex s...
Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoreti...
There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. Howeve...
What kind of things are social rules? The paper starts from the critique of social rules articulated...
Game Theory can simultaneously be viewed as a positive and a normative theory: on one hand, it descr...
Tuomela’s work on group agents and social institutionsis very rich and insightful. Although I agree ...
This article aims to contribute to a critical ontology of social objects. Recent works on collective...
This article aims to present some of the initial work of developing a social science grounded game t...
In this paper I discuss Searle's analysis of social ontology in the light of his account of the sour...
We test the assumption that preferences are unchanged throughout a strategic game in the absence of ...