Add to ORKGThis paper analyses a sufficient condition for uniqueness of equilibrium in two-sided matching with non-transferable utility. The condition is easy to interpret, being based on the notion that a person’s characteristics both form the basis of their attraction to the opposite sex, and determine their own sexual preferences.Uniqueness, matching, marriage.
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comThe paper defines a measure on the set ...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, including matching residen...
In this paper we show that a one-to-one two-sided matching market possesses a unique stable matching...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwis...
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Ga...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of...
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is...
This thesis gives a contribution to matching theory. It examines three one-to-one matching models: t...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comThe paper defines a measure on the set ...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...
This paper analyses conditions on agents' preferences for a unique stable matching in models of two-...
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, including matching residen...
In this paper we show that a one-to-one two-sided matching market possesses a unique stable matching...
AbstractIn the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage mo...
Bipartite matching problem is to study two disjoint groups of agents who need to be matched pairwis...
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Ga...
In this paper, we introduce interdependent preferences to a classical one-to-one matching problem t...
Stable matchings may fail to exist in the roommate matching problem, both when utility is transferab...
The goal of the stable marriage problem is to match by pair two sets composed by the same number of...
We know from Gale and Shapley (1962) that every Two-Sided Matching Game has a stable solution. It is...
This thesis gives a contribution to matching theory. It examines three one-to-one matching models: t...
This is a chapter in preparation for the Handbook of Family Economics, Shelly Lundberg and Alessandr...
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comThe paper defines a measure on the set ...
We propose a methodology for estimating preference parameters in matching models. Our estimator appl...
International audienceStable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical comb...