We use recent developments in the multi-task principal-agent methodology to study a sharecropping contract that was pervasive in central Italy. We distinguish between subsistence crops and cash crops. We analyse the spillover effect from one crop to the other, and we show that this reduces the ability of this sharecropping economy to adjust to a changed environment. We trace the effects of the changes in agricultural prices in the second half of the nineteenth century. Finally, we propose some explanation for the puzzling phenomenon of the reintroduction of many feudal clauses in the sharecropping contract when the rest of the Italian economy was beginning to modernize. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science.
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated wit...
We test the predictions of contract theory using agrarian contracts from medieval Tuscany
Agrarian contracts such as sharecropping are frequently modelled as principal agent relationships. A...
International Economic History Congress. Land, labour and tenure : the institucional arragements of ...
Although sharecropping was found until recently throughout the Mediterranean region, the contract is...
at Chapel Hill for very helpful comments. We are also indebted to Francesco Bonomi for his simple ye...
We examine the working of a sharecropping contract, the "rabassa morta". We argue, in line with much...
The traditional view that sharecropping was a cause of low productivity in European agriculture pri...
There is no consensus among specialists in agricultural contracts over whether the long-term ineffic...
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated wit...
For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping co...
We analyse output risk in Italian agriculture over the period 1870-1914. We use data on a set of 16 ...
In a world with asymmetric information, contractual terms are an important incentive device. This Pa...
The purpose o f the paper is to determine the influence o f today’s economic, legal and social proc...
the paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of investment in agriculture in ...
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated wit...
We test the predictions of contract theory using agrarian contracts from medieval Tuscany
Agrarian contracts such as sharecropping are frequently modelled as principal agent relationships. A...
International Economic History Congress. Land, labour and tenure : the institucional arragements of ...
Although sharecropping was found until recently throughout the Mediterranean region, the contract is...
at Chapel Hill for very helpful comments. We are also indebted to Francesco Bonomi for his simple ye...
We examine the working of a sharecropping contract, the "rabassa morta". We argue, in line with much...
The traditional view that sharecropping was a cause of low productivity in European agriculture pri...
There is no consensus among specialists in agricultural contracts over whether the long-term ineffic...
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated wit...
For long periods, and in line with recent theoretical literature, the rabassa morta sharecropping co...
We analyse output risk in Italian agriculture over the period 1870-1914. We use data on a set of 16 ...
In a world with asymmetric information, contractual terms are an important incentive device. This Pa...
The purpose o f the paper is to determine the influence o f today’s economic, legal and social proc...
the paper examines the spread of sharecropping that followed a wave of investment in agriculture in ...
Recent literature on sharecropping has emphasized its importance in reducing problems associated wit...
We test the predictions of contract theory using agrarian contracts from medieval Tuscany
Agrarian contracts such as sharecropping are frequently modelled as principal agent relationships. A...