Add to ORKGI model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive industry. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under time consistent policies. Forthcoming in Environmental and Resource Economicsenvironmental, regulation, tax, dynamic, game, Environmental Economics and Policy, Q25, H32, D62,
Producción CientíficaWe analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings w...
In this paper we claim that the disadvantage in the pollution control is not primarily the accumulat...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control s...
This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal ( Consistency and Optimality in a Dynamic ...
I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game i...
The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and ...
The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and ...
In this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a...
In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a...
This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and ...
In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms of a country and the social...
Treballs Finals del Màster d'Economia, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs...
In this paper we propose a leader – follower dynamic model of taxation with the government imposing ...
Producción CientíficaIn this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic ...
When a regulator cannot observe or infer individual emissions, corrective policy must rely on ambien...
Producción CientíficaWe analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings w...
In this paper we claim that the disadvantage in the pollution control is not primarily the accumulat...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control s...
This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal ( Consistency and Optimality in a Dynamic ...
I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game i...
The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and ...
The recent push for environmental regulation has invigorated the discussion of mechanism design and ...
In this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic interaction between a...
In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a...
This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and ...
In this paper we model the conflict between the group of polluting firms of a country and the social...
Treballs Finals del Màster d'Economia, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs...
In this paper we propose a leader – follower dynamic model of taxation with the government imposing ...
Producción CientíficaIn this paper we present a Stackelberg differential game to study the dynamic ...
When a regulator cannot observe or infer individual emissions, corrective policy must rely on ambien...
Producción CientíficaWe analyze optimal pollution standards and enforcement strategies in settings w...
In this paper we claim that the disadvantage in the pollution control is not primarily the accumulat...
We study a trade-off between economic and environmental benefits using a two-stage optimal control s...