The Influence of High-Level Employee Compensation, Family Control, and Internationalization on Firm Performance: Evidence from Taiwan

[[abstract]]根據 Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006)的研究，我們試圖在家族控制盛行的台灣，是否也存在著任用親信的情形。我們利用公司特性、董事會特性與公司治理變數分別建構經理人與董事薪酬。結果發現經理人與董事的超額薪酬之間存在顯著的正相關。我們假設此正向關聯可能導因於未發現的公司複雜度，也可能是董事與經理人之間有勾結自肥的行為。然而，研究發現此超額報酬與公司的良好表現有關。因此，我們的結論為經理人與董事的超額報酬可能導因於公司複雜度所需。接下來，，我們將國際化變數放進迴歸式中。雖然公司績效並未直接受國際化影響，但我們發現國際化會引誘經理人與董事從事勾結自肥的行為。[[abstract]]Based on the research of Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006), we try to find out if cronyism exists in Taiwan where family control is prevalent. We model CEO and director compensation using firm characteristics, board characteristics, and governance variables. A significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation is found. We hypothesize that this relationship could be due to firm complexity or excess compensation of directors and CEO. However, we find that excess compensation is associated with firm outperformance. We therefore conclude that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to firm complexity instead of cronyism. Then, internationalization variables are put in the regression. Although firm performance is not directly affected, we find internationalization could motivate CEO and directors to do mutual back scratching or cronyism.[[note]]碩