Board Structure and Hedging

[[abstract]]本研究藉由檢驗高財務危機的公司是否進行避險的比例與避險程度較低，來證實風險移轉行為是否存在，且探討董事會結構是否能影響高財務危機公司的避險策略，因而減少公司從事風險移轉的可能性。本文使用2004年到2010年S&P 500非金融業公司作為樣本，發現董事會規模、審計委員會規模、審計委員會開會次數、審計公費、審計委員會財務專家、獨立董事規模及比例和進行避險的機率及避險比率呈顯著正相關，且當公司處於高財務危機時，董事會結構中的成員越多元與中立且更積極進行監督時會增加公司避險的機率，進而保護債權人，表示董事會結構是影響企業避險決策的重要監理管理機制。最後，本文建立一董事會公司治理變數來探討公司治理強度對避險的影響，顯示董事會治理強度越強公司會增加避險機率及避險程度且使得高財務危機公司較不會從事風險移轉行為。[[abstract]]This paper examines whether risk-shifting behavior exists by reducing the hedging probability and extent of hedging in financially distressed firms and whether board structure can affect hedging decision to mitigate risk-shifting. Using the sample of S&P 500 nonfinancial firms over the period 2004 to 2010, we find that board size, number of audit committee, meeting number of audit committee, audit fees, financial experts in audit committee, and number (Percent) of independent directors have a positive effect on whether to hedge and extent of hedging. Furthermore, the active monitoring of board can enhance non-hedging distressed firms to hedging, which can protect creditors against risk-shifting in financially distressed firms. Lastly, we use a corporate governance index to test the strength of governance on hedging and show that the more strongly governed firms the higher probability and extent of hedging and less to perform risk-shifting. Overall, the results suggest that board structure is a good monitoring mechanism on corporate risk management.[[note]]碩