We consider the problem of computing a large stable matching in a bipartite graph where each vertex ranks its neighbors in an order of preference, perhaps involving ties. Let the matched partner of u in a matching M be M(u). A matching M is said to be stable if there is no edge (a, b) such that a is unmatched or prefers b to M(a) and similarly, b is unmatched or prefers a to M(b). While a stable matching in G can be easily computed in linear time by the Gale-Shapley algorithm, it is known that computing a maximum size stable matching is APX-hard. In this paper we first consider the case when the preference lists of vertices in A are strict while the preference lists of vertices in B may include ties. This case is also APX-hard and the curre...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We consider the problem of computing a large stable matching in a bipartite graph where each vertex ...
We consider the problem of computing a large stable matching in a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) whe...
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in ...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable match...
The problem of finding a largest stable matching where preference lists may include ties and unaccep...
We consider the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum size when both ties and unacceptable...
Abstract. We consider the variant of the classical Stable Marriage prob-lem where preference lists c...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the stable marriage and hospitals/residen...
Consider the bipartite matching problem with two sets of participants: men (L) and women (R). Each p...
In an instance of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists, stable matc...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...
We consider the problem of computing a large stable matching in a bipartite graph where each vertex ...
We consider the problem of computing a large stable matching in a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) whe...
We consider instances of the classical stable marriage problem in which persons may include ties in ...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage problem, stable match...
The problem of finding a largest stable matching where preference lists may include ties and unaccep...
We consider the problem of finding a stable matching of maximum size when both ties and unacceptable...
Abstract. We consider the variant of the classical Stable Marriage prob-lem where preference lists c...
The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfie...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the stable marriage and hospitals/residen...
Consider the bipartite matching problem with two sets of participants: men (L) and women (R). Each p...
In an instance of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists, stable matc...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
When ties and incomplete preference lists are permitted in the Stable Marriage and Hospitals/Residen...
We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem in which preference lists may contain ...