In their chapter in Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (2001, Cambridge University Press), Burtis and Kobayashi never defined their model\u27s discount rate, making replicating their simulation results difficult. Through our own simulations, we were able to verify their results when using a discount rate of 0.10. We also identified two new types of equilibria that the authors overlooked, doubling the number of distinct equilibria in the model
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have attempted to clarify one of the most vexing issues faci...
May a dominant firm refuse to share its intellectual property (IP) with its rivals? This question l...
We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement p...
The idea that there is a tension between antitrust and the intellectual property laws is readily exa...
A vertically integrated firm, having acquired the intellectual property (IP) through innovation to b...
We show the implications of preference function on the optimal licensing contract.As the market e...
Investments in scientific and technological knowledge depend on the level of excludability. In this ...
We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect of a u...
In a comment to my paper "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies," Martínez-Sánchez (2007) shows t...
The creation of an industry standard is a process that has much in common with the creation of a pat...
The literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights evidences a broad scholarly ...
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynami...
Transaction cost economics ( TCE ) has radically altered industrial organization\u27s explanation fo...
A legal system that relies on private property rights to promote economic development must consider ...
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of general welfare or consumer welfare has been de...
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have attempted to clarify one of the most vexing issues faci...
May a dominant firm refuse to share its intellectual property (IP) with its rivals? This question l...
We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement p...
The idea that there is a tension between antitrust and the intellectual property laws is readily exa...
A vertically integrated firm, having acquired the intellectual property (IP) through innovation to b...
We show the implications of preference function on the optimal licensing contract.As the market e...
Investments in scientific and technological knowledge depend on the level of excludability. In this ...
We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect of a u...
In a comment to my paper "The Economics of IPR Protection Policies," Martínez-Sánchez (2007) shows t...
The creation of an industry standard is a process that has much in common with the creation of a pat...
The literature on the economic analysis of intellectual property rights evidences a broad scholarly ...
This paper develops an incomplete contract model of the licensing relationship to analyze the dynami...
Transaction cost economics ( TCE ) has radically altered industrial organization\u27s explanation fo...
A legal system that relies on private property rights to promote economic development must consider ...
Whether antitrust policy should pursue a goal of general welfare or consumer welfare has been de...
Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley have attempted to clarify one of the most vexing issues faci...
May a dominant firm refuse to share its intellectual property (IP) with its rivals? This question l...
We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement p...