In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractual consent, they are missing the crucial problem of legitimacy. In Parts II and IV, he responds to the criticisms of his consent theory of contract advanced by Jay Feinman and Dennis Patterson. Both Feinman and Patterson object to the enterprise in which the author and others are engaging, and he explains why each is wrong to dismiss the current debate over default rules. Finally, in contrast, in Part III the author shows how Steven Burton\u27s theory of default rules, which he finds most congenial, is quite compatible with his despite the fact that Burton thinks they disagree
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...
In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractua...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law have dramatically over-estimated the importance of volunt...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law dramatically over-estimated the importance of voluntary c...
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not expressly agreed t...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law dramatically over-estimated the importance of voluntary c...
My friend and former colleague Omri Ben-Shahar has established a reputation for providing nuanced an...
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...
In Part I, the author contends that when economists persistently ignore the importance of contractua...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
In this article, the author challenges the received wisdom of gap-filling in the absence of consent...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law have dramatically over-estimated the importance of volunt...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law dramatically over-estimated the importance of voluntary c...
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not expressly agreed t...
Our theoretical approaches to contract law dramatically over-estimated the importance of voluntary c...
My friend and former colleague Omri Ben-Shahar has established a reputation for providing nuanced an...
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...
The author begins by responding to Coleman\u27s rational choice approach to choosing default rules. ...
We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal force against an individual is morally just...