Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inconclusive. Here we use a nested-dynamic programming framework to estimate an intra-seasonal dynamic model that explicitly incorporates a farmer's crop abandonment decision. The estimation is implemented for selected Texas counties where actuarial performances of the crop insurance program are poor and high incidences of acreage abandonment are frequently observed.Farm Management,
This article examines the extent to which actual crop insurance indemnification behavior conforms to...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
Monitoring is one way to alleviate the moral hazard problem rampant in most crop insurance programs....
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
[[abstract]]In this paper, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance pro...
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that th...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. Whi...
Emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater informa...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
This article examines the extent to which actual crop insurance indemnification behavior conforms to...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
Monitoring is one way to alleviate the moral hazard problem rampant in most crop insurance programs....
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
[[abstract]]In this paper, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance pro...
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program has been inc...
may make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, provided that th...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. Whi...
Emerging precision agriculture technologies allow farms to make input decisions with greater informa...
By altering the probability distribution of farm income, crop insurance programs affect farmer's inp...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
This article examines the extent to which actual crop insurance indemnification behavior conforms to...
This paper examines the factors influencing farmer participation in crop insurance schemes, but unli...
Monitoring is one way to alleviate the moral hazard problem rampant in most crop insurance programs....