Add to ORKGWe study minimum cost spanning tree games in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines costs of links. We prove the nonemptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core, that is, the existence of the ex ante incentive compatible mechanisms for allocating the total cost to agents
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be con...
A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, ...
International audienceWe study the problem of sharing in a fair manner the cost of a service provide...
In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking ...
In this paper we consider the minimum cost spanning tree model. We assume that a central planner aim...
It is a known result that for a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game a Core allocation can be dedu...
We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core s...
In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connect...
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a...
Abstract This paper studies problems of establishing a minimum cost network and of determining a fai...
We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core s...
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algori...
We associate to each minimum cost spanning tree problem a characteristic function v+ where v+ (S) de...
We study the Pareto optimal equilibria payoffs of the non-cooperative game associated with the cost ...
We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-...
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be con...
A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, ...
International audienceWe study the problem of sharing in a fair manner the cost of a service provide...
In this paper, we analyze cost sharing problems arising from a general service by explicitly taking ...
In this paper we consider the minimum cost spanning tree model. We assume that a central planner aim...
It is a known result that for a minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) game a Core allocation can be dedu...
We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core s...
In the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, we present a bargaining mechanism for connect...
This paper addresses the optimization problem to maximize the total costs that can be shared among a...
Abstract This paper studies problems of establishing a minimum cost network and of determining a fai...
We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core s...
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algori...
We associate to each minimum cost spanning tree problem a characteristic function v+ where v+ (S) de...
We study the Pareto optimal equilibria payoffs of the non-cooperative game associated with the cost ...
We associate to each cost spanning tree problem a non-cooperative game, which is inspired by a real-...
In this paper, we analyze the cost allocation problem when a group of agents or nodes have to be con...
A new way is presented to define for minimum cost spanning tree (mcst-) games the irreducible core, ...
International audienceWe study the problem of sharing in a fair manner the cost of a service provide...