A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the final market. In a Cournot model, an extended RJV is welfare enhancing only when the Antitrust Authority is strong, so that the increase in distortion is limited, and when the size of the technical improvement is large, so that the introduction of the innovation is more valuable.RJV, R&D, collusion
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with hom...
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We formulate an infin...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in t...
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal ma...
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an olig...
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (...
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region ...
We characterise the interplay between firms\u27 decision in product development undertaken through a...
Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation faci...
We examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the correspo...
We re-examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the i...
We analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international cont...
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an olig...
In a Research Joint Venture (RJV) firms undertake joint research and coordinate their research strat...
In a differentiated oligopoly model with free entry, the static welfare loss from collusion is large...
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with hom...
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We formulate an infin...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in t...
A wider RJV extension hastens process innovations at the cost of increasing collusion in the .nal ma...
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an olig...
We present a continuous-time generalization of the seminal R&D model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (...
In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region ...
We characterise the interplay between firms\u27 decision in product development undertaken through a...
Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint ventures (RJV) participation faci...
We examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the correspo...
We re-examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the i...
We analyze the effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) on consumer welfare in an international cont...
This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We consider an olig...
In a Research Joint Venture (RJV) firms undertake joint research and coordinate their research strat...
In a differentiated oligopoly model with free entry, the static welfare loss from collusion is large...
We reassess the respective gains from R&D cooperation and competition in a Cournot Duopoly with hom...
We discuss government-leading welfare-improving collusion in a mixed duopoly. We formulate an infin...
This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in t...
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