This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design challenges—dealing with market power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market design.Auctions, Electricity Auctions, Market Design
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wh...
Auctions have recently been regarded as a useful alternative to other support schemes for the settin...
The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including pri...
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the ...
Published: 02 November 2017 Electricity markets are designed to provide reliable electricity at leas...
Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the rec...
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design a...
The emerging field of market design applies auctions and matching to solve resource allocation probl...
The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have re...
This paper explains why current electricity markets are not fit for purpose and propose a new market...
Abstract—Power systems have distinctive features that greatly complicate the development of auction ...
This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to...
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wh...
Auctions have recently been regarded as a useful alternative to other support schemes for the settin...
The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including pri...
This paper examines principles of market design as applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the ...
Published: 02 November 2017 Electricity markets are designed to provide reliable electricity at leas...
Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the rec...
Motivated by the regulatory debate in electricity markets, we seek to understand how market design a...
The emerging field of market design applies auctions and matching to solve resource allocation probl...
The recent debates over discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions in the UK and elsewhere have re...
This paper explains why current electricity markets are not fit for purpose and propose a new market...
Abstract—Power systems have distinctive features that greatly complicate the development of auction ...
This paper assesses the contribution of laboratory experiments to the economics of design applied to...
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wh...
Auctions have recently been regarded as a useful alternative to other support schemes for the settin...
The early experience in the restructured electric power markets raised several issues, including pri...