Linguistic understanding and semantic theory

2012-07-25This book defends a theory of linguistic understanding, or what is alternatively called linguistic competence or semantic competence; it also defends a view about how linguistic understanding is related to semantic theory. The central target for a theory of understanding is to answer the question, “What is it to understand and competently use a language?” It is natural to think that understanding a language is a matter of knowing what various expressions in the language mean. Since semantic theory is a theory of what various expressions in a language mean, it is a natural and widely held view that linguistic understanding is simply a matter of knowing something like a semantic theory. According to this view, we essentially arrive at the best theory of understanding by pointing to the best semantic theory and simply saying that to understand and be competent with a language is to know that. Thus, the theory of understanding has been thought by many to be a trivial offspring of semantic theory, and the theory of understanding is generally passed over as an independent topic of inquiry. I argue, however, that linguistic understanding cannot simply be a matter of knowing a semantic theory. I develop a theory of understanding distinct from semantic theory, explain how the two are related, and why both are essential. ❧ Four major threads run through the chapters. First is a proposal about how to understand competent use. A theory of understanding must begin with a characterization of the linguistic abilities we are trying to account for. Competence consists in at least three abilities: referential competence, recognitional competence, and inferential competence. Referential competence is the ability to use a word with its meaning – using it in various sentences to make assertions, commands or promises, to ask questions, and form linguistically mediated thoughts (I will henceforth only mention the case of assertion). For example, a speaker is referentially competent with the name ‘Felicity’ if she can use it to refer to Felicity and thus, among many other things, use the sentence ‘Felicity is a horse’ to assert that Felicity is a horse. It is widely accepted in the literature that we can successfully use certain words, such as names and some natural kind terms (i.e. ‘elm’), without knowing much about their reference or meaning. I argue that the relevant sense of successful use in these cases is referential competence. I extend this idea by arguing that mere referential competence is possible for a much greater variety of expressions, including some that carry a higher standard of understanding (‘red’, ‘bachelor’, ‘horse’ etc.). Such words do carry a higher standard of understanding, but this doesn’t mean mere referential competence isn’t possible, only that there is a larger gap between mere referential competence and a “normal” level of understanding. The gap is filled in my view by recognitional and/or inferential competence. ❧ A speaker is recognitionally competent with a word to the extent that she can recognize whether or not it applies in a given circumstance – i.e. to the extent that she can correctly determine whether or not ‘red’ applies to various objects. A speaker is inferentially competent with a word to the extent that she can see how its meaning relates to the meanings of other words in the language. Knowing to infer ‘Felicity is a horse’ from ‘Felicity is a mare’ is an instance of inferential competence with ‘mare’ (and ‘horse’). A key point about the abilities is that they suggest a highly graded picture where understanding can range from minimal to robust. Mere referential competence, accompanied by no significant measure of the other abilities, is the most minimal level of genuinely linguistic understanding possible. Robust understanding comes with the addition of a significant measure of recognitional and/or inferential competence. ❧ The second thread is negative, arguing that semantic theory alone can’t provide a theory of understanding. I argue for this primarily on the grounds that the notion of “knowing” a semantic theory isn’t suitably graded to account for competent use. One speaker can be more competent with a given expression than another speaker. But if we ask semantic theory to give us a theory of understanding, it can only give us the same claim for both speakers – namely, that each knows the meaning of the expression, and this clearly gives us no way to explain how they differ in competence. ❧ The third thread connects competence to the theory of speech acts. There are two questions about the extent to which mere referential competence is possible. First, are there classes of words for which mere referential competence leads to serious breakdown? I argue that this is so – for example, if a speaker doesn’t understand what inferences are licensed by a logical term such as ‘or’, her attempts to use the term will be defective. Second, how many words can a speaker be merely referentially competent with – in a sentence or an entire language – before breakdown ensues? I argue that mere referential competence is only secure against a rich background of understanding for most other words. A speaker typically will not use more than one or two minimally understood words in a sentence, and can, in many cases at least, do so successfully. But attempts to use much more than one or two words lead quickly to defective speech acts. Even in these cases, however, I argue that the defect isn’t always a complete breakdown of the speech act, so that it doesn’t count as an assertion at all. I think the defect can instead be a violation of a necessary condition on fully rational action, and that the speech act may count as an assertion even though it is irrational in a certain sense. Defending this view involves a graded theory of speech acts – since understanding is graded, the rationality of speech acts is too, and similarly admits of more or less, and different kinds or aspects. ❧ The last thread is a defense of the claim that my proposed theory of understanding is a requisite part of an overall theory of language. The strategy here is to show how the theory of understanding is required in order to explain conversational communication. This involves a shift from individual assertions to the broader context of conversations. Since conversational competence is graded, this helps explain why linguistic competence is too. A conversation is a set of assertions coordinated with one another, and with the non-linguistic activities of its participants. So in order for a speaker to fully understand a conversation, she must not only be able make assertions, but must understand how the assertions in a conversation relate – both to each other (secured by inferential competence), and to things that agents are able to recognize in the world (secured by recognitional competence). I argue that individual words are normatively associated with information about the word’s content (i.e. ‘horse’ is normatively associated with information about horses). This information is part of what must be known in order to fully understand a word, and supplies pragmatic presuppositions in a conversational context that help speakers arrive at a common understanding of the two kinds of conversational relation they must track. Hence, what it is to understand and competently use a language, or even know the meaning of a word, involve a heavily pragmatic dimension. ❧ The overall view I defend is thus one according to which the theory of understanding belongs on the pragmatic side of the picture. The theory of understanding works in tandem with semantic theory, via a story about the semantics-pragmatics interface, to provide an overall account of linguistic communication