In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device i...
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by re...
An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have th...
It is shown that well-behaved preference orderings may exhibit the Ellsberg paradox on the set of un...
Princeton University. I thank the audiences for helpful comments. A decision-maker is utility-sophis...
Savage (1954) provided a set of axioms on preferences over acts that were equivalent to the existenc...
grantor: University of TorontoThe Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory axiomatized by ...
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations...
We study the interplay of probabilistic sophistication, second order stochastic dominance, and uncer...
Machina & Schmeidler (Econometrica, 60, 1992) gave preference conditions for probabilistic sophistic...
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and updating ac...
This paper studies a target-based procedure to rank lotteries that is normatively and observationall...
The well-known principle that a decision maker's subjective probabilities are determined from his pr...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66507/2/10.1177_002200276200600106.pd
I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization cri...
In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device i...
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by re...
An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have th...
It is shown that well-behaved preference orderings may exhibit the Ellsberg paradox on the set of un...
Princeton University. I thank the audiences for helpful comments. A decision-maker is utility-sophis...
Savage (1954) provided a set of axioms on preferences over acts that were equivalent to the existenc...
grantor: University of TorontoThe Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) Theory axiomatized by ...
Coherent imprecise probabilistic beliefs are modelled as incomplete comparative likelihood relations...
We study the interplay of probabilistic sophistication, second order stochastic dominance, and uncer...
Machina & Schmeidler (Econometrica, 60, 1992) gave preference conditions for probabilistic sophistic...
This paper states necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and updating ac...
This paper studies a target-based procedure to rank lotteries that is normatively and observationall...
The well-known principle that a decision maker's subjective probabilities are determined from his pr...
Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/66507/2/10.1177_002200276200600106.pd
I show that the predictive content of the hypothesis of subjective expected utility maximization cri...
In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device i...
How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by re...
An important implication of the expected utility model under risk aversion is that if agents have th...