The authors examine firm profitability in mixed duopoly equilibrium with one labor managed (LM) firm and one profit maximizing (PM) firm, and with strategic investment. Conventional wisdom suggests that firms deviating from profit-maximization will suffer forced exit in the long run. The authors reverse this conclusion. In mixed LM-PM duopoly with strategic investment, no equilibrium can have both firms making zero profits, and PM profitability implies LM profitability, but not the converse. Adverse parameter shifts would cause the PM firm to exit first. Empirical evidence is consistent with this prediction of robust market survivability of LM firms.
This paper examines how differences in the opportunity costs of assets employed by firms affect the ...
Monopsony power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisons between...
This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a la...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic ...
This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment...
It has recently been shown that the separation of ownership and control in a capitalist firm may not...
This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is...
A dynamic three-stage game is modelled to analyse the capacity choice in a mixed oligopoly with priv...
This paper builds a theory of profit sharing between two firms in a duopoly market through which fir...
This paper considers a continuous-time dynamic mixed market model of labor investment decisions of a...
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed...
Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives ...
Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives ...
International audienceWe build on Mason and Weeds [10]’s model of duopoly investment under uncertain...
This paper examines how differences in the opportunity costs of assets employed by firms affect the ...
Monopsony power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisons between...
This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a la...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic...
The behaviour of labor managed and profit seeking firms in a Cournot duopoly with capital strategic ...
This paper shows that the discussion of Lambertini and Rossini (1998) as to the strategic investment...
It has recently been shown that the separation of ownership and control in a capitalist firm may not...
This paper examines the equilibrium outcomes of firms’ decision games to hire managers when there is...
A dynamic three-stage game is modelled to analyse the capacity choice in a mixed oligopoly with priv...
This paper builds a theory of profit sharing between two firms in a duopoly market through which fir...
This paper considers a continuous-time dynamic mixed market model of labor investment decisions of a...
This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed...
Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives ...
Competition among profit-seeking firms in an oligopolistic industry inherently generates incentives ...
International audienceWe build on Mason and Weeds [10]’s model of duopoly investment under uncertain...
This paper examines how differences in the opportunity costs of assets employed by firms affect the ...
Monopsony power in the labour market is shown to have important consequences for comparisons between...
This paper considers a two-production-period model in which a state-owned firm competes against a la...