The resiliency of Arab authoritarianism and the Arab-Israeli conflict: the United States' role in the cases of Egypt and Jordan

Restricted until 11 Dec. 2009.This study focuses on the external dimension of the resiliency of authoritarianism in Egypt and Jordan. It proceeds by eschewing the pre-requisite approaches, which argue that lack of some condition, such as sufficient economic development or cultural and religious compatibility with democracy, prevents transition to democracy. Instead, the study follows a contingency approach, at the center of which lies the authoritarian incumbent's strategic calculations over the expected domestic costs of toleration and oppression of the opposition. In filling the gap in the literature and providing a policy-relevant explanation for Arab authoritarianism, the study contends that the regime also considers the expected external costs.; A close examination of the historical record revels that the US relationships with Jordan and Egypt are a function of the US-Israeli special relationship, which itself is a function of Israel's perceived strategic value to the US, American-Israeli cultural and political affinity, and the pro-Israel lobby. In the wake of the devastating Arab defeat in the 1967 War and Israel's occupation of Arab territories, and due to this "special" relationship, the US has followed an Israel-centered approach towards the region and supported Israel's policies, resulting in the non-resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This significantly accounts for the rise of political Islam and Arab anti-Americanism. These two currents are further reinforced by the fact that both Egypt and Jordan reached separate peace treaties with Israel, which left the Palestine problem unresolved.; Against this backdrop, the United States, in essence, strikes a bargain in a two-level game with the two authoritarian regimes: at level one Jordan and Egypt preserve their peace treaty with Israel and support US policies in the region; in exchange, the US provides not only generous financial support but also political support in the form of non-interference in the regimes' conduct toward their domestic opposition. Since these currents (i.e. political Islam and anti-Americanism) and the US-regime dynamics provide the opposition with its raison d'être, the United States is provided with an additional rationale to support the regimes: to prevent the mostly Islamist opposition from coming to power. At level two while the US Congress readily ratifies such a bargain, Arab authoritarian regimes extract ratification through cooptation, manipulation or oppression. Fully aware of American calculations and objectives, the regimes in Jordan and Egypt accurately calculate that there is little or no external cost to oppressing their opposition