Institutional variance of the democratic peace, 1816-2002: electoral, executive, and federal institutions in time and space

UnrestrictedAcademic scholars and politicians have promoted democracy as a strategy for sustaining peace or preventing conflict. This optimism of 'democratizing for peace' is based on the observation that democratic states maintain peace among themselves and the point is reached, beyond which further democratization will produce more peace in the world. This dissertation argues that such optimism is premature as long as the spatial validity of the relationships remains unchecked and the theoretical arguments of the Democratic Peace are underdeveloped. Based on the assumption that domestic politics can constrain foreign policy decision-making, I suggest a theoretical framework that emphasizes the intrinsic and extrinsic role of norms and institutions for decisions about conflict. Choosing to focus on the extrinsic importance of governmental institutions, I argue that constraining mechanisms are represented in institutional sub-systems of democracy: electoral systems, executive systems, and federal systems. Based on my own collection of data on institutional indicators, the empirical analysis suggests that democracies' institutional setup affects their conflict behavior internationally. Electoral systems have the strongest and most consistent impact on democracies' conflict behavior. Rejecting disputable assumptions of temporal and spatial universality, this work specifies a new framework for cumulation of knowledge about democracy and interstate conflict. I show that the associations explored are unique in each geographical region.; In light of recent trends in the growth of democracy and democratic institutions, I conclude that the prospect for more peace varies greatly between regions. As a consequence, inference about democracy and conflict is non-additive and further research and theorizing is needed to incorporate spatial and temporal conditionalities. If democratizing states adopt the most conflict promoting institutions, 'zones of conflict' in regions characterized by a large number of autocratic states may be developing alongside 'regional zones of peace.