Add to ORKGThis paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.Public Goods, Direct Provision, Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design, Open Source Software
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
We characterize the optimal mechanism for the provision of n public goods in an economy with m agent...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second fo...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
We present two resilient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. Both mechanisms adopt a kno...
This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can pr...
This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents’...
This paper investigates how the trade-off between organization costs, transaction costs and economie...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in an economy that is l...
Kuzmics C, Steg J-H. On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budge...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
In this paper we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
We characterize the optimal mechanism for the provision of n public goods in an economy with m agent...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framewor...
We present two resilient mechanisms: the first for the provision of a public good, and the second fo...
We experiment a new mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good: in a fixed period individ...
We present two resilient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. Both mechanisms adopt a kno...
This paper characterizes the optimal contract designed by a profit-maximizing monopolist, who can pr...
This paper studies the optimal provision mechanism for multiple excludable public goods when agents’...
This paper investigates how the trade-off between organization costs, transaction costs and economie...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in an economy that is l...
Kuzmics C, Steg J-H. On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budge...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
In this paper we consider the effect of ambiguity on the private provision of public goods. Equilibr...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...
We characterize the optimal mechanism for the provision of n public goods in an economy with m agent...
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision in a large economy. Our...