The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behavior of arbitrators under alternative forms of arbitration. This article suggests that it is natural for empirical economists to now expand their focus to include issues related to the behavior of negotiators. In this connection, three key aspects of negotiator behavior are discussed: (1) the decision to settle a dispute voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration; (2) the strategy for selecting an arbitrator; and (3) the final bargaining position to advance before an arbitrator.
Since at least 1991, issues surrounding mandatory arbitration of employment and other disputes have ...
Informed parties bargaining for their mutual advantage will tend to agree to provisions that maximiz...
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the econom...
This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration....
This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure w...
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration,...
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an act...
In this paper we introduce a model of arbitration decision making which generalizes several previous...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. ...
We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of fina...
Disputing parties who are unable to settle their differences will end up before an adjudicator (typi...
In this Article, written for this symposium issue on Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration, I...
Since at least 1991, issues surrounding mandatory arbitration of employment and other disputes have ...
Informed parties bargaining for their mutual advantage will tend to agree to provisions that maximiz...
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the econom...
This paper analyzes and compares arbitrator behavior under conventional and final-offer arbitration....
This study develops a model of bargaining that demonstrates that an interest arbitration procedure w...
A series of experiments compares bargaining behavior under three different settings: no arbitration,...
This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an act...
In this paper we introduce a model of arbitration decision making which generalizes several previous...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by acceptin...
Abstract We consider a model of bargaining by concessions where agents can terminate negotiations by...
Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. ...
We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of fina...
Disputing parties who are unable to settle their differences will end up before an adjudicator (typi...
In this Article, written for this symposium issue on Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration, I...
Since at least 1991, issues surrounding mandatory arbitration of employment and other disputes have ...
Informed parties bargaining for their mutual advantage will tend to agree to provisions that maximiz...
These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the econom...