Add to ORKGExtending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent may use its current price to signal its strength, in order to deter entry. In contrast with conventional limit pricing, we show the entry of weaker firms. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this phenomenon to arise in equilibrium, in the benchmark cases that no second entry is profitable.Dynamic Signaling, Limit Pricing, Entry Deterrence
This paper shows that dynamic price cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under d...
This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incumbent firm of a n...
This article belongs to the game theoretic and information economics literature dealing with the pro...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility an...
This paper considers a long-standing question in the field of Industrial Organization: Can an incumb...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent rm, who has private information about his own...
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limi...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first two essays, I generalize the theory of limi...
This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We c...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of product...
This paper shows that dynamic price cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under d...
This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incumbent firm of a n...
This article belongs to the game theoretic and information economics literature dealing with the pro...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent...
Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we analyze an infinite horizon entry model where an incumbent ...
We study a standard entry game where the incumbent makes a long runinvestment choice and a pricing d...
We study an entry model where an incumbent privately informed about costs can make a cost-reducing i...
A Milgrom-Roberts style signalling model of limit pricing is developed to analyze the possibility an...
This paper considers a long-standing question in the field of Industrial Organization: Can an incumb...
We study a two periods entry game where the incumbent rm, who has private information about his own...
In this paper, a simple game-theoretic entry deterrence model is developed that integrates both limi...
AbstractThe paper studies the incumbent-entrant problem in a fully dynamic setting. We find that und...
This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first two essays, I generalize the theory of limi...
This paper shows how a multimarket incumbent can use low pre-entry prices for entry deterrence. We c...
We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of product...
This paper shows that dynamic price cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under d...
This paper considers an entry-deterring nonlinear pricing problem faced by an incumbent firm of a n...
This article belongs to the game theoretic and information economics literature dealing with the pro...