In this paper, we study dynamic alliance formation among agents in competitive markets. We look at n agents selling substitutable products competing in a market. In this setting, we examine models with deterministic and stochastic demand, and we use a two-stage approach. In Stage 1, agents form alliances (coalitions), and in Stage 2, coalitions make decisions (price and inventory) and compete against one another. To analyze the stability of coalition structures in Stage 1, we use two notions from cooperative games--the largest consistent set (LCS) and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF)--which allow players to be farsighted. Thus, in forming alliances, players consider two key phenomena: First, players trade off the size o...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the nega...
I study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to ...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
This paper studies how the possibility for firms to sign collusive agreements (as for instance being...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade i...
This Paper examines recent theoretical developments in the theory of coalition stability. It focuses...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade i...
htmlabstractNon-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towa...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets with decentra...
This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form ...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the nega...
I study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to ...
The first chapter introduces the topic of coalition structures and stresses its importance and impac...
This paper studies how the possibility for firms to sign collusive agreements (as for instance being...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade i...
This Paper examines recent theoretical developments in the theory of coalition stability. It focuses...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets where trade i...
htmlabstractNon-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towa...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
We consider the collective incentives of buyers and sellers to form cartels in markets with decentra...
This paper analyzes coalition formation in a model of contests with linear costs. Agents first form ...
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coali...
Non-cooperative game theory purports that economic agents behave with little regard towards the nega...
I study games of coalition formation with open membership where firms form associations in order to ...