Banzhaf, Deegan–Packel, index of voting power, Johnston, paradoxes of voting power, Penrose, postulates for index of voting power, Shapley value, Shapley–Shubik, simple voting game, weighted voting game,
Abstract Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed wi...
Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decis...
This thesis is an introducion to the theory of coalition games intended for readers oriented on form...
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power ...
We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power indices is raft with ...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power in-dices is raft with...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9514-6We con...
Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some g...
Abstract Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed wi...
Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decis...
This thesis is an introducion to the theory of coalition games intended for readers oriented on form...
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
This paper compares the theoretical bases of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power ...
We propose a new power index based on the minimum sum representation (MSR) of a weighted voting game...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems. The classical power indices applied to simple...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power indices is raft with ...
Despite the many useful applications of power indices, the literature on power in-dices is raft with...
Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political scie...
Abstract For measuring an individual's voting power of a voting game, some power indices are pr...
We present three axioms for a power index defined on the domain of simple (voting) games. Positivity...
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10726-016-9514-6We con...
Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed with some g...
Abstract Power indices are commonly required to assign at least as much power to a player endowed wi...
Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decis...
This thesis is an introducion to the theory of coalition games intended for readers oriented on form...
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