Law as an interpretive concept: A study of the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin

The purposes of this study are both expository and critical. The expository purposes are: first, to show that Dworkin\u27s legal philosophy presents a comprehensive and unified conception of law; second, to show that Dworkin\u27s conception is a significant and (in some respects) superior alternative to the traditional views in legal theory--natural law and legal positivism. Dworkin conceives of law as an interpretive concept designed to construct an internal, participants\u27 view of a community\u27s legal practice. This constructive interpretation is meant to show that each community\u27s legal practice embodies principles and values drawn from the community\u27s basic political morality. Moreover, this interpretation both explains the existing elements of the legal record (e.g., statutes, precedents, regulations, etc.), and justifies these elements by connecting them with a defensible background political morality. Dworkin\u27s conception of law as interpretation provides a more consistent account of (a) the process of adjudication, especially in hard cases; and (b) the internal obligations of legal practitioners, particularly judges. Moreover, the interpretive conception of law allows Dworkin to offer a better account of the connection between law and moral and political principles and convictions. The critical appraisal of Dworkin\u27s theory reveals two serious problems. First, it presupposes an unlikely degree of moral and political coherence in existing legal practice. Second, interpretations on Dworkin\u27s theory are context-dependent and provide no theoretical ground for making evaluative judgments between divergent forms of legal practice